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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States recently issued an opinion 
which could bring an end to a long-disputed issue in trademark law.1 In a 
rare grant of certiorari on a trademark case, the Court sought to provide 
clarity and to unify a split of authority relating to the preclusive effect of 
T.T.A.B. decisions on subsequent infringement suits.  This Comment will 
examine the context of B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.2 by 
viewing the underlying legal principles, and also by considering the 
possibilities for future interpretation. Most decisions rendered by the 
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“T.T.A.B.” or “Board”) will not have 
preclusive effect in subsequent trademark infringement litigation because the 
likelihood of confusion issue will not be identical in both proceedings.  This 
Comment seeks to quell the proposition that a T.T.A.B. decision on 
likelihood of confusion precludes re-litigation of likelihood of confusion at 
the district court.  Undoubtedly, some decisions may satisfy the requirements 
set forth in B & B Hardware such that preclusive effect will be given, but 
this Comment argues that the vast majority of cases will not meet this 
requirement. 
II.  THE LAW OF PRECLUSION 
The law of preclusion prevents a litigant from re-litigating claims or 
issues that have already been decided by an appropriate tribunal.3 Res 
judicata, or preclusion law, is a doctrine involving two distinct, yet related 
mechanisms called collateral estoppel and claim preclusion.4 Collateral 
estoppel stands for the proposition that if an issue of fact or law is decided 
by a final judgment after it has been actually litigated, the decision is 
conclusive in a subsequent action between the same parties irrespective of 
whether that issue is part of the same or a different claim.5 Claim preclusion 
operates to treat a judgment as the full measure of relief to be administered 
between the parties with respect to the same cause of action, or claim.6 
 
 1. Patrick H. J. Hughes, Supreme Court Says That TTAB Rulings Can Preclude Infringement Suits 
(U.S.), WESTLAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAILY BRIEFING, Mar. 25, 2015, 2015 WL 1311775. 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 3. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2015). 
 4. Id. 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (emphasis added). 
 6. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 218, 321 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kasper Wire Works, 
Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments 
§ 463 (2015). 
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This Comment will focus on collateral estoppel—also known as issue 
preclusion. There are four requirements for the doctrine of issue preclusion 
to apply: 
(1) the issues in both proceedings must be identical, (2) the issue in the 
prior proceeding must have been actually litigated and actually decided, 
(3) there must have been a full and fair opportunity for litigation in the 
prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated must have been 
necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.7 
Courts are not the only adjudicative bodies whose decisions can be 
given preclusive effect; in some circumstances, administrative bodies and 
agencies can render decisions which will support a finding of preclusion in 
later proceedings.8  For such a decision to have preclusive effect, the 
administrative tribunal must satisfy the essential elements of adjudication 
which include: 
(a)  Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the adjudication . . . 
; 
(b) The right on behalf of a party to present evidence and legal argument 
in support of the party’s contentions and fair opportunity to rebut evidence 
and argument by opposing parties; 
(c) A formulation of issues of law and fact in terms of the application of 
rules with respect to specified parties concerning a specific transaction, 
situation, or status, or a specific series thereof; 
(d) A rule of finality, specifying a point in the proceeding when 
presentations are terminated and a final decision is rendered; and 
(e) Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the 
proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in 
question, having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in 
question, the urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and the 
opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence and formulate legal 
contentions.9 
There are several fundamental exceptions to issue preclusion. First, 
preclusion shall not apply if the party who is going to be adversely affected 
by the application of preclusion cannot, as a matter of law, seek a review of 
the judgment in the initial action.10  Also, if differences exist between the 
two adjudicating bodies with respect to the quality and extensiveness of the 
procedures used to adjudicate, issue preclusion shall not apply.11 If the 
 
 7. Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see also 47 AM. JUR. 2D 
Judgments § 518 (2015). 
 9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 10. Id. at § 28(1). 
 11. Id. at § 28(3). 
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burden of persuasion is heavier with respect to the issue, or if the burden has 
shifted to the adversary with respect to the issue, the issue is not precluded.12 
Another important exception exists when “‘the amount in controversy in the 
first action [was] so small in relation to the amount of controversy in the 
second that preclusion would be plainly unfair.’”13 
III.  TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
A.  Generally 
The T.T.A.B. was created when Congress passed amendments to the 
Lanham Act in 1958, and it serves several Lanham Act functions.14 The 
Board has first jurisdiction in cases of inter partes proceedings dealing with 
matters of federal registration of trademarks.15 Inter partes proceedings 
include oppositions, cancellations, and concurrent use proceedings, and such 
proceedings always include one party squarely challenging another party in 
relation to federal trademark registration.16 The T.T.A.B. also hears appeals 
from refusals to register, which are issued by United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“U.S.P.T.O.”) examining attorneys. Appeals from final 
refusal are ex parte proceedings as they only involve the applicant and 
U.S.P.T.O.17 
The T.T.A.B. is not an Article III court; the jurisdiction conferred to the 
Board only permits it to make decisions as to the federal registration of 
trademarks, and it cannot adjudicate questions about the constitutionality of 
statutes or regulations .18 Although all Board decisions can be cited, the 
precedential value of decisions made by the Board depends on whether the 
decision has been determined to be “citable as precedent.”19 This Comment 
 
 12. Id. at § 28(4). 
 13. B & B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. j) (alteration in original). 
 14. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20:99 
(4th ed. 2015). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at § 20:100. 
 17. Id. at § 21:1. 
 18. In re The Government of the District of Columbia, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1588, 1602 (T.T.A.B. 2012) 
(“More importantly, we cannot rule on applicant’s constitutional arguments. The Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board is an administrative tribunal, not an Article III court, and we have no authority to declare 
provisions of the Trademark Act unconstitutional.”); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 20:99. 
 19. See General Mills, Inc. v Health Valley Foods, 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1270, 1275 n.9 (T.T.A.B. 1992) 
(“In the future, the Board will disregard citation as precedent of any unpublished or digest decision. Even 
if a complete copy of the unpublished or digest decision is submitted, the Board will disregard citation as 
precedent thereof. An exception exists, of course, for those situations in which a party is asserting issues 
of claim preclusion, [or] issue preclusion . . . .”). 
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will primarily discuss opposition proceedings and their importance in later 
trademark infringement suits, as this was the procedural issue discussed in B 
& B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.20 
B.  Oppositions 
Opposition proceedings involve a party opposing an applicant’s 
application for a mark because the party “believes that he would be damaged 
by the registration of [the] mark.”21 Opposition proceedings function as a 
“backstop” for examination by U.S.P.T.O. trademark examining attorneys.22 
An opposition takes place after an examiner publishes the mark in the 
Trademark Official Gazette (“Gazette”).23 The Gazette operates to give 
notice to anyone who may be harmed by the registration of the mark.24  
Diligent mark holders have procedures in place to ensure detection of any 
marks that appear in the Gazette that may damage the mark holder.25 When 
such a mark holder feels their rights would be damaged by registration of the 
mark in question, that mark holder can file an opposition. 
The main issue in opposition proceedings is often whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion between the applicant’s mark and the opposer’s 
mark(s).26 During an opposition proceeding, the test for likelihood of 
confusion involves an examination of the mark as it appears in the 
application and often not as the applicant actually uses the mark in the 
marketplace.27 Here, it is worth noting that the T.T.A.B. can be presented 
with evidence of actual marketplace usage of the opposer’s mark if the 
opposer relies, at least in part, on those uses as grounds for the opposition.28 
In addition, the Board can sometimes consider actual specimens of 
applicant’s use when deciding likelihood of confusion.29 This means that 
 
 20.   B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2006). 
 22. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 20:2. 
 23. Id. at § 19:132. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at § 20:4. 
 26. Id. at § 20:15. 
 27. Id. at § 20:24. 
 28. Fossil, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451, 1998 WL 962201, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (“[I]t 
is quite true that an opposer is not limited in an opposition to relying solely on those marks for which it 
has registrations. An opposer can rely upon other forms of its marks or indeed other marks for which it 
lacks registrations, provided opposer is the prior user. However, these other marks must be pled or tried 
by the consent of the parties.”); see also Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford, Ltd., 937 F.2d 
729, 734 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 29. 4 McCarthy, supra note 14, §§ 23:78, 23:60 (“[I]n determining whether an applicant’s mark is 
confusingly similar to another mark, it is appropriate in limited circumstances to compare actual 
specimens of applicant’s use of the mark with other allegedly similar marks.”). 
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often a decision rendered during an opposition proceeding does not resolve 
likelihood of confusion issues with respect to those uses not disclosed in the 
application and those uses not relied upon by the opposer.30 If an applicant 
is dissatisfied with an adverse decision at the T.T.A.B., the applicant can 
appeal the decision to either the Federal Circuit or an appropriate district 
court.31 Upon such a review, a court views the opposition de novo and allows 
the parties to introduce new evidence to support their position.32 
C.  Procedures of the T.T.A.B. 
For preclusion to apply, the law requires that the litigant is given a “full 
and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue.33 The U.S.P.T.O. created and 
continues to update a procedure manual in the T.T.A.B named the Trademark 
Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”).  The TBMP limits its own 
application by recognizing that it is merely a compilation of existing 
legislative and decisional law.34 The procedural rules of the Board are similar 
in many ways to the rules of procedure in federal court. In fact, the TMBP 
makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence applicable to inter partes proceedings, except as otherwise 
provided.35 One distinction between proceedings at the T.T.A.B. as opposed 
to a federal court is that proceedings before the Board are conducted in 
writing.36 In most respects, however, the T.T.A.B.—an administrative 
tribunal—functions the same way as a federal court.37 
 
 30. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 1293, 1307–08 (2015). 
 31. EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1984); see also 
3 McCarthy, supra note 14, at §§ 20:1–25. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (2011); e.g., Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012); see, e.g., 
Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, L.L.C., 739 F.3d 150, 154–55 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying de novo 
review to trademark case); see also 3 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 21:21. 
 33. See supra pt. II. 
 34. TBMP Introduction (2015), (“The manual does not modify, amend, or serve as a substitute for 
any existing statutes, rules, or decisional law and is not binding upon the Board, its reviewing tribunals, 
the Director, or the USPTO.”). 
 35. 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.122(a), 2.116 (2014); see TBMP, supra note 34, §§ 101.01, 101.02. 
http://tbmp.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/TBMP/current/tbmpd1e2.xml/manual/TBMP/current/TBM
P-100d1e1.xml 
 36. 37 C.F.R. § 2.191 (2014). 
 37. Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F. 2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he 
PTO rules governing the procedure in oppositions are designed to approximate the proceedings in a 
courtroom trial.”). 
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IV.   LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
A.  Importance 
Likelihood of confusion is a key concept in trademark law.  A 
trademark functions as a source identifying tool which serves to prevent 
consumer confusion and deception in the marketplace.38 Likelihood of 
confusion appears in multiple places throughout the Lanham Act and is 
important for both statutory and common law trademark purposes. The first 
place a trademark applicant may encounter likelihood of confusion is during 
application for federal registration. An examining attorney may refuse a 
trademark on the basis of likelihood of confusion because the Lanham Act 
bars registration of confusingly similar marks.39 Also, during the application 
process, an applicant may face an opposition proceeding after being 
published in the Gazette.40 Opposition proceedings are often based on an 
opposer’s claim that the applicant’s mark is likely to be confused with the 
opposer’s mark(s).41 An opposer must have protectable rights when basing 
an opposition on likelihood of confusion under 15 U.S.C. 1052(d).42 In 
addition to its importance to registration matters, likelihood of confusion is 
often the central inquiry when deciding a case of trademark infringement 
under 15 U.S.C. 1125(a).43 
Whether a likelihood of confusion analysis arises under the Lanham Act 
or at common law is dependent on several different considerations, each of 
which has a different legal effect. If a trademark examining attorney finds 
that a likelihood of confusion exists for a given mark, the applicant is 
prevented from federally registering its mark.44 This decision can be 
appealed to the T.T.A.B., which will decide, ex parte, the issue of likelihood 
of confusion, with the same legal consequences.45 There are two scenarios 
where two adversarial parties squarely contest likelihood of confusion—
 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012); see also 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 14, § 3:2. 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
 40. See supra pt. III § B. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 3 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 20:15. 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (2012); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“One is subject to liability for infringement of another’s trademark, trade name, 
collective mark, or certification mark if the other’s use has priority . . . and in identifying the actor’s 
business or in marketing the actor’s goods or services the actor uses a designation that causes a likelihood 
of confusion . . . .”). 
 44. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 45. 3 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 20:99. 
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inter partes T.T.A.B. proceedings and infringement lawsuits.46 The legal 
effects of those two different types of proceedings are vastly different. An 
applicant who loses an opposition proceeding at the T.T.A.B. is prevented 
from registering that mark, subject to a review by a federal court.47 A 
trademark infringement lawsuit can yield damage awards well into the tens 
of millions of dollars.48 Federal registration of a trademark is valuable and 
the losing the ability to register a mark is harmful to an applicant. However, 
an applicant’s loss in front of the T.T.A.B. will not have preclusive effect on 
a potentially more harmful infringement lawsuit, unless the issue decided 
was truly the exact same issue. As will be shown below, in most cases, an 
applicant’s loss during an opposition will not carry preclusive effect in a 
subsequent infringement lawsuit. 
B.   Test for Likelihood of Confusion 
The is no uniform test for likelihood of confusion for infringement, but 
the tests employed by the various federal courts have similar factors.49 The 
T.T.A.B. and U.S.P.T.O. examining attorneys use the following factors to 
decide likelihood of confusion in registration matters, referred to as the 
DuPont factors, as established in In re E. I. Du Pont DeNemours & Co.:50 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. 
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as 
described in an application or registration or in connection with which a 
prior mark is in use. 
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade 
channels. 
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i. e. 
“impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. 
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use). 
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. 
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. 
 
 46. Oral Argument at 3:47, B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1293 (No. 13-352), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_13_352 (“[I]n the opposition or cancellation 
proceeding there is a concrete dispute between the holders of two marks.”); see infra pt. III § A (inter 
partes proceedings can be oppositions, cancellations, or concurrent use). 
 47. See e.g., 3 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 20:3. 
 48. See, e.g., Matthew Bultman, U-Haul Blasts $60 M Trademark Award to PODS, LAW360, April 
9, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/641241/u-haul-blasts-60m-trademark-award-to-pods. 
 49. 4 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 23:19; see also Malla Pollack, Likelihood of Confusion Pursuant 
to the Federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051 et seq., 112 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d § 10 (2010). 
 50. See TBMP, supra note 34, at § 1207.01 (Jan. 2015). 
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(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been 
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. 
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, 
“family” mark, product mark). 
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior 
mark: 
(a) a mere “consent” to register or use. 
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i. e. limitations 
on continued use of the marks by each party. 
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the 
related business. 
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative 
of lack of confusion. 
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use 
of its mark on its goods. 
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i. e., whether de minimis or 
substantial. 
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.51 
The Federal Circuit also uses the DuPont factors as its test for likelihood 
of confusion.52 Though the Federal Circuit and the T.T.A.B. use the same 
factors for registration and infringement purposes, the two tribunals will 
often examine these questions in the context of different evidentiary 
records.53 
V.   BACKGROUND OF B & B HARDWARE V. HARGIS INDUSTRIES 
This part gives an overview of the different types of treatment T.T.A.B. 
decisions have received, but it will not discuss the substantive issues 
underlying the decisions at length. After discussing the split of authority, this 
part then briefly examines the procedural posture and relevant background 
information found in the district court and court of appeals decisions in B & 
B Hardware v. Hargis Industries. 
A.  Previous Split of Authority 
Federal courts have been hesitant to give T.T.A.B. decisions preclusive 
effect on subsequent proceedings.  In Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & 
Crawford, Ltd., the Second Circuit found issue preclusion was inapplicable 
because the marketplace’s use of the marks was not examined during the 
 
 51. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361. 
 52. Pollack, supra note 50. 
 53. See supra pt. III § B. 
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registration proceedings.54 This case has extensive procedural background, 
but the relevant facts are that Jim Beam filed an inter partes cancellation 
proceeding with the Board, alleging that the “BEAMISH” mark was likely 
to cause confusion with Jim Beam’s marks.55 The Board held there was no 
likelihood of confusion.56 Jim Beam appealed to the Federal Circuit, which 
reversed the Board’s decision and cancelled Beamish’s mark.57 Jim Beam 
subsequently filed an infringement lawsuit in federal district court and 
sought to preclude Beamish from re-litigating the issue of likelihood of 
confusion, arguing that the Federal Circuit already decided the issue during 
the registration proceeding.58 The district court granted Jim Beam’s motion 
for summary judgment, holding that issue preclusion should apply, but the 
district court further held that claim preclusion should not because 
cancellation and infringement claims are significantly different.59 
Beamish appealed to the Second Circuit, and there, the court found that 
issue preclusion was inapplicable. In infringement suits, the marks are 
viewed in the context of its use. The likelihood of confusion issue can be 
different for infringement suits and cancellation proceedings.60 The Second 
Circuit decision pointed to the lack of evidence and findings relating to the 
marketplace context of use during the registration proceedings in front of the 
T.T.A.B and the Federal Circuit.61 Specifically, the court found that because 
the T.T.A.B. did not examine or reference either party’s labels and because 
the comparison of the marks in context was “immaterial to the Federal 
Circuit’s decision,” issue preclusion was inapplicable.62  Further support for 
this holding is found in the assertion that an appeal of a T.T.A.B. decision 
“must be carefully examined to determine exactly what was decided and on 
what evidentiary basis.”63 The Second Circuit concluded the tests for 
infringement are different standards because the context of a mark’s use 
should additionally be considered in infringement suits. 
 
 54. 937 F.2d 729, 735–36 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 55. Id. at 731. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 732. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 732–33. 
 60. Id. at 734 (“[B]oth sections refer to whether the use of a mark is likely to cause confusion. When 
the trademarks are simply a word or words, however, the standards by which that likelihood is judged are 
different because the factual frame of reference used by the adjudicating body is different.”). 
 61. Id. at 735. 
 62. Id. (explaining that the likelihood of confusion standard for registration did not change upon 
review to the Federal Circuit). 
 63. Id. at 734 (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:31 
(2d ed. 1984)). 
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The Seventh Circuit found that preclusion was appropriate because the 
parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues during an 
opposition proceeding at the T.T.A.B.64 In EZ Loader Trailers, Inc. v. Cox 
Trailers, Inc., the court was presented with a significantly different factual 
background than that of Jim Beam.65 EZ Loader Trailers (“EZ Loader”) filed 
an opposition against Cox Trailers (“Cox”), alleging that registration of 
Cox’s mark would cause confusion.66 During the T.T.A.B. proceedings, the 
parties submitted testimonies and hundreds of exhibits.67 In light of this 
evidence, the Board discussed various aspects of the use of each party’s 
marks: 
The question whether opposer’s mark “EZ LOADER” considered in its 
entirety, is merely descriptive is more difficult, principally because of the 
context of opposer’s use of this mark in its advertising, brochures, etc. 
Thus, applicant’s argument that “EZ LOADER” is merely descriptive of 
opposer’s trailers, i.e., that it merely conveys to purchasers that opposer’s 
trailers  are “easy to load” has considerable support in opposer’s own 
materials, as illustrated by the following excerpts from the exhibits: 
“Boats Load EZ.” (Opp. exh. 10.) 
“All EZ Loaders * * * make loading, especially in wind and current, 
a much easier proposition * * * *” (Opp. exh. 11.) 
“Tilt tongue model with lock for easier loading.” (Opp. exh. 12.) 
“The easiest loading you will ever experience.” (Opp. exh. 14.) 
“EZiest LOADING”. (Opp. Exh. 15.)68 
The Seventh Circuit opinion found this extensive evidentiary record 
was generated during a proceeding in front of an administrative body acting 
in a judicial capacity.69 The court was able to rely on the T.T.A.B. decision, 
because the opposition proceeding used the extensive evidentiary record to 
consider the marks’ use in the context of advertisement and the channels 
through which the goods were marketed.70 The Seventh Circuit accordingly 
found preclusion was appropriate because the T.T.A.B., supplied with an 
extensive record, considered the use of the marks in their marketplace 
context.71 
 
 64. EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 65. See supra pt. V § A para. 2. 
 66. EZ Loader, 746 F.2d at 376. 
 67. Id. 
 68. EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 597, 1982 WL 52013, at *4 
(T.T.A.B. 1982). 
 69. EZ Loader, 746 F.2d at 378. 
 70. Id. at 379. 
 71. Id. at 378–79. 
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In 1974, the Fifth Circuit in American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. 
Heritage Life Insurance Co. looked extensively at the preclusion issue in a 
similar context and found that preclusion should not apply because 
application of preclusion would go against the congressional intent of the 
Lanham Act.72 The court noted that decisions rendered by administrative 
agencies can have preclusive effect, so long as the agency acts in a judicial 
capacity and satisfies the normal rules for preclusion.73 The Fifth Circuit’s 
primary reason for not extending issue preclusion to T.T.A.B. administrative 
decisions was because the court reasoned the Lanham Act was not intended 
to confer such preclusive effect on the T.T.A.B.74 Specifically, the court 
believed that because review of Board decisions could be reviewed de novo 
on appeal, legislative intent was not aligned with preclusion. However, the 
court asserted that T.T.A.B. findings should be entitled to “great weight” 
when cases are taken on direct appeal to the district courts, notwithstanding 
de novo reviews.75  Although the Fifth Circuit did not believe preclusion 
should apply, the court failed to articulate a definite standard for giving 
deference to the Board. 
B.   District Court & Eighth Circuit Proceedings Regarding Issue 
Preclusion 
The facts surrounding the B & B Hardware v. Hargis Industries are that 
Hargis Industries, a manufacturer of self-drilling screws for use in the 
construction of metal buildings, applied for a federal trademark registration 
for the mark “SEALTITE” in July 1996.76 B & B Hardware, a manufacturer 
of fastener products sold under the name “SEALTIGHT,” filed an opposition 
to Hargis’s application claiming that registration of Hargis’s mark would 
cause confusion.77 The procedural back-drop of the case, as it relates to issue 
preclusion, is such that in 2002, Hargis’s mark was published in the Gazette, 
 
 72. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 9 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated by B 
& B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 73. Id.; see also supra pt. II para. 3. 
 74. Am. Heritage, 494 F.2d at 9. 
 75. Id. at 10 (“[F]indings as to confusing similarity of marks must be accepted as controlling unless 
the contrary is established by evidence which, in character and amount carries thorough conviction, 
notwithstanding that the case is heard de novo in the district court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. SEALTITE, Registration No. 75129229. 
 77. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 2013), reversed by 
B & B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015); see also SEALTITE Proceeding History, 
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR), http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=75129229 
&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=statusSearch (follow “Proceedings” hyperlink; then follow 
“Type of Proceeding: Opposition” hyperlink). 
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and B & B thereafter filed an opposition.78 During the opposition 
proceedings, B & B also filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in federal 
district court. Then, before the conclusion of the infringement suit, the 
T.T.A.B. found in B & B’s favor of opposer, B & B in the opposition 
proceeding,79 and Hargis did not seek judicial review of the T.T.A.B.’s 
opposition decision.80 The T.T.A.B. found that there was a likelihood of 
confusion between the marks.81 In the on-going infringement suit, B & B 
then sought to preclude Hargis from litigating the likelihood of confusion 
issue at the district court, arguing that issue had already been decided in the 
T.T.A.B.82 
After assessing the principles of preclusion law, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Arkansas held that preclusion does not apply because 
the T.T.A.B. is not an Article III Court.83  Additionally, the district court did 
not allow B & B to introduce the T.T.A.B. decision into evidence because 
they felt that it would confuse the jury.84 
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, B & B’s main contention was that the 
previous likelihood of confusion finding by the T.T.A.B. precluded Hargis 
from re-litigating the issue.85  The court assumed that T.T.A.B. decisions 
could have preclusive effect, but they found preclusion was not proper 
because the issues were not the same.86 In that court’s view, the issues were 
not the same because infringement suits require the court to look at the 
marketplace uses, whereas that is not required in T.T.A.B. proceedings.87 
Also, the Eighth Circuit felt the T.T.A.B. placed too much emphasis on the 
appearance and sound of the mark when spoken, as opposed to other 
likelihood of confusion factors.88 In its opinion, the Eight Circuit succinctly 
stated one of its problems with applying issue preclusion in this scenario: 
“the fact that Hargis was unable to overcome B & B’s challenge to the 
registration of Hargis’s mark on the basis of likelihood of confusion does not 
 
 78. SEALTITE Proceeding History, supra note 77. 
 79. B &B Hardware, 716 F.3d at 1023. 
 80. SEALTITE Proceeding History, supra note 77. 
 81.  Id. 
 82. B & B Hardware, 716 F.3d at 1022–23. 
 83. Id. at 1022. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1023. 
 86. Id. at 1023–26. 
 87. Id. at 1025. 
 88. Id. 
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establish that B & B can meet its burden of persuasion for trademark 
infringement purposes”89 
A dissenting opinion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision asserted that the 
T.T.A.B. had, in fact, considered the entire marketplace context of the marks, 
but the dissent failed to identify any specific points in the record indicating 
that the T.T.A.B. considered such marketplace context.90 Furthermore, the 
dissent thought the majority’s holding would operate to prevent T.T.A.B. 
decisions from ever having preclusive effect.91 
VI.  B & B HARDWARE V. HARGIS INDUSTRIES—THE SUPREME COURT 
CASE 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the 
district court should have applied issue preclusion to the T.T.A.B.’s decision 
on likelihood of confusion.92 In a seven to two decision written by Justice 
Alito, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that “a court should 
give preclusive effect to T.T.A.B. decisions if the ordinary elements of issue 
preclusion are met.”93 The opinion expressly agreed with the assertion, 
presented in dissent at the Court of Appeals, that the Eighth Circuit 
majority’s conclusion would “make it difficult for the doctrine [of issue 
preclusion] to ever apply in trademark suits”.94 
In its analysis, the Court initially reviewed the goals of trademark law 
and the process of federal registration.95 The opinion notes that T.T.A.B. 
proceedings are similar to civil action suits in federal district court, where 
“the primary way in which T.T.A.B. proceedings differ from ordinary civil 
litigation is that ‘proceedings before the Board are conducted in writing’” 
and that the Board’s decision is based upon the written record.96 The Court 
summarized the T.T.A.B.’s decision by acknowledging the Board’s 
consideration of several DuPont factors, including: (1) whether B & B’s 
mark was famous, (2) how the products are used, and (3) how much the 
marks resemble each other.97 The Court then began its review of the Eighth 
Circuit’s holdings by stating that three reasons why the Eighth Circuit 
 
 89. Id. at 1026. 
 90. Id. at 1029 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
 92. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302 (2015). 
 93. Id. at 1299. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1299–1301; see supra pts. II, III, IV. 
 96. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300 (quoting TTAB Manual § 12.03). 
 97. Id. at 1302. 
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affirmed: (1) the T.T.A.B. uses different factors than the Eighth Circuit for 
likelihood of confusion analysis; (2) the T.T.A.B. placed too much emphasis 
on the appearance and sound of the two marks; and (3) Hargis had the burden 
of persuasion before the Board, whereas B & B had the burden in the district 
court.98 
In order to quell any concerns about non-judicial issue preclusion, the 
Court’s substantive legal analysis began by examining precedent relating to 
general administrative preclusion.99 The fact that a decision is rendered by a 
non-Article III court does not foreclose the possibility of that decision having 
preclusive effect in later proceedings,100 and on this matter, the Court held 
that “absent a contrary indication, Congress presumptively intends that an 
agency’s determination . . . has preclusive effect.”101 By finding that there is 
no evident reason why congress would not have intended T.T.A.B. decisions 
to have preclusive effect, the Court noted there is no textual prohibition on 
preclusion arising from such a scenario and that the Lanham act does not 
forbid such preclusion.102 Preclusion law, according to the Court, does not 
require a party to exercise their right to appeal an adverse decision in order 
for that decision to have preclusive effect.103 The fact that an applicant who 
is dissatisfied with a decision of the T.T.A.B. can file an appeal that will be 
reviewed de novo in a federal court does not categorically prevent T.T.A.B. 
decisions from having preclusive effect.104 Furthermore, the Court concluded 
that if Congress intended for registration proceedings to be expedited, they 
would not have included de novo review of T.T.A.B. decisions.105  It is 
important to note that the Court ends its discussion by limiting the 
application of this holding when it concludes, “[F]or a great many 
registration decisions issue preclusion obviously will not apply because the 
ordinary elements will not be met. For those registrations, nothing we say 
today is relevant.”106 
Moving past the issue of whether the Lanham Act prevents issue 
preclusion, the Court examined whether there is a categorical reason why 
registration decisions could never meet the ordinary elements of issue 
 
 98. Id. 
 99.  Id. at 1303. 
 100.  Id. at 1304. 
 101.  Id. at 1304–05 (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 796–799 (1986)). 
 102.  Id. at 1305. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 1306. 
 106.  Id. 
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preclusion.107 The Court therefore analyzed the following questions: (1) 
whether the issues are ever identical; (2) whether the issues are ever capable 
of being actually litigated and actually decided in the T.T.A.B.; and (3) 
whether the parties can ever have a full and fair opportunity for litigation in 
registration proceedings.108 The Court, in its main holding, found that all of 
these questions are answered in the affirmative.109 
Regarding whether there are differences in the standard for likelihood 
of confusion when considering registration as opposed to infringement, the 
Court concluded the standards were the same for three reasons: 
First, the operative language is essentially the same; the fact that the 
registration provision separates “likely” from “to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive” does not change that reality. Second, the 
likelihood-of-confusion language that Congress used in these Lanham Act 
provisions has been central to trademark registration since at least 1881. 
That could hardly have been by accident. And third, district courts can 
cancel registrations during infringement litigation, just as they can 
adjudicate infringement in suits seeking judicial review of registration 
decisions. There is no reason to think that the same district judge in the 
same case should apply two separate standards of likelihood of 
confusion.110 
Though that excerpt suggests that the Court found the operative 
language of the standard identical, it also seemed to acknowledge that the 
textual difference is significant in practice.  Therefore, the Court accepted 
that an applicant before the Board in registration proceedings often relies on 
the information contained in their application; similarly true, an opposing 
party often relies on federal registrations of marks.111 This suggests that for 
T.T.A.B. registration decisions that rely solely on the information in the 
application, preclusion should not apply to later infringement suits.  In this 
case, the Court limited the application of its holding by stating, “[U]nlike in 
infringement litigation, the Board’s determination that a likelihood of 
confusion does or does not exist will not resolve the confusion issue with 
respect to non-disclosed usages.”112 The Court’s holding with respect to the 
standard for likelihood of confusion is that even though the T.T.A.B. may 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See infra pt. II. para. 1. 
 109.  B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1310. 
 110.  Id. at 1307 (citations omitted). 
 111.  Id. at 1307–08. 
 112.  Id. at 1308 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, B & 
B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (No. 13-352)) (quotation marks omitted). 
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not always consider the same usages as a federal court, it still applies the 
same standard for likelihood of confusion.113 
Regarding the requirements of (1) actually litigating and deciding an 
issue and (2) having a full and fair opportunity to do so, the Court found that 
“there is no categorical reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or 
fairness, of the agency’s procedures. In large part they are exactly the same 
as in federal court.”114 The Court attributed the narrower scope of discovery 
at the T.T.A.B. to the fact that the T.T.A.B. often has fewer usages at issue.115 
Recall that an exception to issue preclusion exists where the amount in 
controversy in the first action is small in comparison to the second action 
such that giving preclusive effect to the decision would be plainly unfair.116 
The Court held that the benefits to federal trademark registration are 
substantial and briefly noted that an applicant facing an opposition will be 
likely to “take the matter seriously.”117  
VII.   SCOPE OF THE HOLDING AND FUTURE INTERPRETATION 
A.  Limiting Language 
At first read, the Supreme Court’s opinion in B & B Hardware v. Hargis 
Industries does not seem sufficiently limited. There are several key points in 
the opinion and in the oral argument that are textually and structurally 
supportive of the Supreme Court’s holding that T.T.A.B. decisions should 
have preclusive effect only in limited circumstances.118 
An analysis of a portion of the main holding—identified by the majority 
as the applicable “rule” for use on remand—is useful for discussing the limits 
of this decision: “So long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion 
are met, when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same 
as those before the district court, issue preclusion should apply.”119 As 
discussed in the opinion and above,120 the ordinary elements of preclusion 
will often not be met because the issues will not be identical due to 
adjudication of different usages. In infringement suits, the analysis involves 
the mark usages in the “entire marketplace context,” and marketplace usages 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 1309 (quotation omitted) (citation omitted). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see infra pt. II 
para. 4. 
 117.  B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1310. 
 118. Id. at 1306, 1310. 
 119.  B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1310. 
 120.  Id. at 1306–10; see infra pts. II, VI. 
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are often not fully disclosed in the applications or registrations considered 
by the T.T.A.B.121 An illustrative example was conceded during oral 
argument by Mr. William M. Jay, the attorney for B & B Hardware—if the 
T.T.A.B., during an opposition, found a likelihood of confusion with respect 
to applicant’s mark for use on “clothes,” and the subsequent infringement 
suit was based on a sub-set of clothes, such as “jeans,” preclusion would not 
apply because the issues are different.122 That is, when the T.T.A.B. finds a 
likelihood of confusion for a broad array of goods and the infringement suit 
is predicated on one subset of that broad array of goods, the issues are not 
the same, and a different analysis of the factors of likelihood of confusion is 
required. 
Further support for this position is evidenced by the structural location 
of the other limiting language within the opinion. Located at the end of a 
discussion rejecting an argument asserting a lack of evident contrary 
congressional intent is the following: “[F]or a great many registration 
decisions issue preclusion obviously will not apply because the ordinary 
elements will not be met. For those registrations, nothing we say today is 
relevant.”123 The location of this excerpt within the opinion suggests that the 
Court wanted to make it clear that even though preclusion comports with 
congressional intent, it is to be applied in limited circumstances. The same 
language is cited in Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion.124  Additionally, 
the same concept is again reiterated at the end of another main holding of the 
opinion, appearing immediately after a discussion holding that the standards 
are the same for likelihood of confusion in registration and infringement, 
provided the following occurs: “[I]f a mark owner uses its mark in ways that 
are materially unlike the usages in its application, then the TTAB is not 
deciding the same issue [that a federal court does]. Thus, if the TTAB does 
not consider the marketplace usage of the parties’ marks, the TTAB’s 
decision should ‘have no later preclusive effect in a suit where actual usage 
in the marketplace is the paramount issue.’”125 
It is evident that the Supreme Court sought to limit the application of 
this holding based on a textual and structural analysis of the opinion. While 
the Court focused on likelihood of confusion, it did not limit its holding to 
 
 121.  Brief for The International Trademark Association in Support of Neither Party at 13–17, B & 
B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1293 (No. 13-352). 
 122.  Oral Argument at 9:15, B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1293 (No. 
13-352), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_13_352. 
 123.  B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1306. 
 124.  Id. at 1310 (Ginsburg, R., concurring) (“That is so because contested registrations are often 
decided upon a comparison of the marks in the abstract and apart from their marketplace usage.”). 
 125.  Id. at 1308 (quoting 6 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 32:101. 
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issues of likelihood of confusion. As such, it seems that decisions of the 
T.T.A.B. could have preclusive effect on other issues. 
B.   The Record Required to Support Preclusion 
Because T.T.A.B. decisions can clearly have preclusive effect on 
subsequent infringement lawsuits, it is exceedingly important to consider the 
evidentiary record that is before the T.T.A.B. This Comment argues that 
unless the T.T.A.B.’s decision is based on marketplace evidence, courts 
should not find preclusion appropriate. The theoretical limitation to this is if 
an infringement action is based solely on the matter contained in federal 
trademark applications or registrations. In EZ Loader Trailers, Inc. v. Cox 
Trailers, Inc., the T.T.A.B. was presented with a robust and extensive 
evidentiary basis for finding likelihood of confusion and, as such, the 
T.T.A.B. decision was entitled to issue preclusion.126 There, the parties 
submitted hundreds of exhibits in addition to substantial testimony.127 
Examination of the record before the T.T.A.B. in B & B Hardware v. 
Hargis Industries reveals the applicant submitted a thirty-one page trial brief, 
and the opposer’s trial brief was nine pages long.128 Together, the parties 
submitted twenty-two exhibits to the T.T.A.B. along with testimony from 
four deponents. Though this record includes evidence that may support a 
decision likelihood of confusion decision for registration purposes, it does 
not seem to exemplify the type of evidentiary record that the Court 
envisioned as the basis for a decision that would have preclusive effect. On 
remand, the district court found that the ordinary elements of issue preclusion 
were met because the usages considered at the T.T.A.B. were “materially the 
same” as the usages before the district court. 129 
VIII.   PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
After a decision is issued for a significant case in any field of law, 
practitioners will have differing opinions as to the effects of the opinion. B 
& B Hardware is no exception, and trademark practitioners have expressed 
a wide array of differing opinions regarding the magnitude and scope of the 
 
 126.  EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 597, 1982 WL 52013, at *3–
5 (T.T.A.B. 1982); see supra pt. V § A para. 3. 
 127.  EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 597, 1982 WL 52013, at *3–
5 (T.T.A.B. 1982); see supra pt. V § A para. 3. 
 128.  Trial Brief of Applicant Sealtite Building Fasteners, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Sealtite Building 
Fasteners (Opp. No. 91155687) (T.T.A.B. 2006) http://tsdr.uspto.gov/caseviewer/pdf?caseId=75129229 
&docIndex=7#docIndex=7. 
 129. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 800 F.3d 427 (Mem) (8th Cir. 2015) 
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decision.130 Many practitioners’ insights deal with ways in which the B & B 
Hardware will change strategic decisions about whether or not to pursue 
action in front of the T.T.A.B., or alternatively, at a federal district court. 
An attorney at Dickstein Shapiro LLP, Dawn Rudenko Albert, finds, 
consistent with this Comment, that preclusion will not apply in the vast 
majority of cases.131 However, she also notes that parties will end up 
spending more money to litigate cases: “Because the stakes will be higher in 
some cases, so too will the attendant resources—money, effort, evidence—
including more frequent requests for de novo review. But this will be of a 
minority of cases. In the majority of the cases, the parties will just be arguing 
over whether preclusion applies— which it won’t.”132 
Alternatively, Steve Borgman of Vinson & Elkins LLP asserts, “[A] 
potential result may be that applicants now strategically narrow the 
description of the goods and services in the application, such as by expressly 
limiting them to certain channels . . . . In addition, potential applicants may 
choose to rely on common law rights and forego registration altogether. The 
reach of the court’s opinion remains unclear.”133 
The contours of the decision in B & B Hardware are certainly going to 
be tested by litigants in the coming years. As another practitioner, Bryan 
Wheelock of Harness Dickey, put it, “Like stockbrokers, we are left to advise 
our clients: ‘TTAB results are not a guarantee of district court 
performance.’”134 
IX.   CONCLUSION 
In the majority of infringement cases, issue preclusion will not be 
applicable because the issue will not be the same as the issue that was before 
the T.T.A.B. This is certainly the case for likelihood of confusion 
determinations of the T.T.A.B. because infringement suits will, more often 
than not, require analysis of marketplace. Judges, litigants, commentators, 
and especially practitioners should take B & B Hardware for what it is 
worth—a limited holding affirming a narrowly applicable, pre-existing 
doctrine. If preclusion is applied by courts in accordance with the limits of B 
& B Hardware, the opinion will affect only a small number of cases, but it 
 
 130. Mark Lebetkin, ed., Attorneys React to Supreme Court’s TTAB Preclusion Ruling, LAW360, 
March 24, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/635039/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-s-ttab-
preclusion-ruling. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
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will affect those cases significantly. Thus, B & B Hardware affirms the 
proposition that T.T.A.B. decisions on likelihood of confusion will have 
preclusive effect on subsequent infringement lawsuits only in rare and 
limited circumstances. 
 
